Teboho Shelile1
Head of Treasury
What went wrong?
I believe that for one to appreciate or even
understand the global financial crisis; its sources
and impact, one must gain an understanding of the
financial system at its very basic level. However
one needs to appreciate that the question of “what
went wrong” in explaining the global financial
crisis is fairly complex, such that even financial
markets experts do not agree on how much weight
should be placed on a particular explanation.
The basic function of banks and other financial
intermediaries is to take deposits generated by
households, corporates, governments and the foreign
sector and put them to use by giving out loans and
making investments. Banks give out loans to the
deficit sector of the economy with the funds from
the surplus sector. This helps households to buy
houses, and businesses to finance their working
capital. Financial markets like the equity markets
and bond markets perform a similar function;
corporates may raise funds by selling bonds directly
to the public. When the financial system is working
as it should, it allocates the funds both prudently
(that is with proper attention to risk) and
efficiently (to the most productive uses).
As a result of globalization funds can be spent in a
country that they were not generated in. In the last
decade oil exporting countries (surplus countries)
have built up large current account surpluses while
on the other hand developed economies have built
vast current account deficit (deficit countries). As
such the United States (the US) and other developed
economies have been recipients of a great deal of
foreign savings. Foreign savings inflows can be
beneficial if the country receiving them uses them
well. However in the US this was not the case.
Financial institutions reacted to the availability
of surplus funds by competing aggressively for them
– to this end, basic requirements like proof of
income and down payments were being over looked by
mortgage lenders.
In the years leading to the crisis, credit to both
households and businesses became relatively cheap
and easy to obtain, however this lending was very
poor as due diligence was not being observed, to the
extent that lenders paid insufficient consideration
to the borrowers’ ability to make monthly payments.
125% loan to value mortgages were being underwritten
and median home prices were rising as much as 14%
annually by 2005; lenders like many other people at
the time expected that house prices would continue
to rise. Therefore 125% loan to value mortgage would
be above water in less than two years – thereby
allowing
borrowers to build up equity in their homes, and
credit would remain easily available, so that
borrowers would be able to refinance if necessary.
Housing markets were not the only ones caught up in
the credit boom. The large flows of global savings
into the US drove down the returns available on many
traditional long-term investments, such as treasury
bonds, causing investors to search for alternatives.
In line with this, the financial industry designed
securities that combined many individual loans in
complex ways. These securities were perceived to be
safe, however as we are well aware these new
securities proved to involve substantial risks –
risks that neither the investors nor the firms that
designed the securities adequately understood at the
outset.
The credit boom began to disentangle in early 2007
when the problems surfaced in the subprime mortgages
market (these are mortgages offered to clients that
are not economically viable), the house prices that
were perceived to continue to grow began to fall in
some parts of the US. Mortgage arrears and defaults
rose, as such there was a continuous downward trend
in housing prices, and this trend still continues
today. Investors were dismayed by the downward trend
on the investment vehicle that they had perceived to
be safe – as such they began to pull back from a
wide range of credit markets, and financial
intermediaries also cut back their lending. The
situation worsened with the bankruptcy of Wall
Street investment bank Lehman Brothers and the
bailout of the insurer American International Group
(AIG). Stock prices fell sharply as investors lost
confidence in financial institutions. The economic
downturn accelerated and global economic growth fell
steeply coupled with a slowdown in international
trade. Declining stock values, a grumbling financial
system, and difficulties in obtaining credit
triggered a remarkably rapid and deep contraction in
global economic activity and employment, a
contraction that has persisted through the first
months of this year. Both the ongoing financial
crisis and economic contraction have posed major
challenges to policymakers worldwide.
What are Central Banks doing to address the
situation?
Central banks and governments in mainly the
industrialized world have taken unprecedented
actions in their attempts to restore confidence in
the financial system. In general the main objective
of any central bank is to contribute to financial
stability by acting to manage and contain financial
disruptions and prevent their spread outside of the
financial sector.
Central banks’ basic policy tool for influencing
economic activity and inflation is their ability to
control the short end of the yield curve – that is
they have control over short-term rates. For example
the South African Reserve Bank (the Reserve Bank)
has control over the repo rate which in turn has a
positive relationship with all other rates. The
Federal Reserve (The Fed) in the United States have
a direct control on federal funds rate, which is the
rate that banks pay each other for overnight loans.
Lower interest rates can be used to stimulate
private-sector borrowing and spending at times like
the present when the economy is suffering from lack
of demand.
In September 2007, shortly after the turbulence in
financial markets began and signs of economic
weakness started to appear, the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) began to aggressively reduce the
federal funds rate. By March 2008, the Fed had cut
the federal funds rate to 2 percent, in an attempt
to promote the declining economic activity. The
demise of Wall Street investment banks has seen the
Fed reduce the federal funds rate further down,
since December 2008, the US policy interest rate has
been essentially zero. In a similar vain, since
December 2008, the Reserve Bank has reduced its
policy rate by 350 basis points (3.5% percentage
points).
In general we have seen significant liquidity
injection, lowering of collateral requirements,
asset swaps, longer-maturity refinancing operations,
intervention in foreign exchange markets, and
co-operation among central banks in their market
operations, monetary accommodation, quantitative or
credit easing, capital injections into banks and
other financial institutions, substantial stimulus
packages, and in some cases nationalization of
banks. Despite all these efforts to stimulate the
economy some economies are still going into
recession. Economists and market participants are
aware that the seeds of the next crisis are sown in
the solutions for the current one; currently we are
reaping the fruits of the seeds that were sown to
counteract the dot.com bubble burst and the events
of September 11. As such we need to ask ourselves
whether the current aggressive response by the
Central Banks, risks inflation down the road.
Does the Central Banks’ aggressive response risk
inflation down the road?
Policy interventions implemented now may be the
lifeline for the world financial system, but the
seeds for the next crisis are sown in the solutions
for the current crisis. That is the aggressive
expansionary policies evident throughout the world
may, inherently, have negative consequences over the
long term. The main objective of these Central Banks
is price stability – as such Central Banks take this
obligation to ensure price stability extremely
serious. However the striking feature of Central
Bank lending and other government financial support
during the current financial crisis is the extent to
which it has gone beyond the boundaries that
previously were understood to constrain such
lending, and that the scope of the financial safety
net ultimately must be rolled back.
Currently inflation is not an issue that many people
are worried about, though the measures taken
currently are potentially inflationary – but
inflation is not necessarily bad. We need inflation
at an acceptable level; this is the issue that the
Central Banks will have to deal with later. At the
moment there is need to revive the global economy to
come back to acceptable levels. From the regulation
school we need to seek a better way forward, for
instance are Basle II and other regulatory
frameworks the best ways to manage the financial
markets prudentially; Regulation can be cumbersome
and involved.
Doctors learn from pathologies, surely economists
and financial markets participants can and will
learn from the economic downturn.
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